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Along with global financial integration and further development of liberalization, 
financial market is becoming more and more competitive, as an important content of 
financial innovation, development and expansion of off-balance-sheet activities 
(OBSA) become a new profit growth point of banks. Meanwhile, great risks contained 
in OBSA show up. Therefore, it has become increasingly urgent for supervision over 
OBSA. OBSA boasts features such as asymmetric information, multi-parties involved 
and a principal rational person. All parties involved gamble and try their best to select 
the best strategy to maximize profits. Game theory which studies the decision-making 
and relevant balancing when economic bodies react against each other is a more 
suitable choice used for making analysis on the actions of OBSA bodies. 
In the thesis, from the basic concept of OBSA, the risk characteristics of OBSA 
and the meaning of supervision over OBSA are defined, and through the theoretical 
analysis on government supervision and combining the failure performance of OBSA 
market, it show clearly the necessity for supervision over OBSA. On such basis, the 
modes and goals of supervision over OBSA both at home and abroad are reviewed, 
and the content of supervision over OBSA contained in Basel Accord as well as the 
practice of supervision over OBSA in China are emphatically introduced. 
By applying the basic principles of game theory, the practice of supervision over 
OBSA in China is studied in this thesis, with such theoretical bases as involved 
market bodies and game rules, and on such basis of absorbing and drawing lessons 
from domestic and international relevant OBSA research results, a rent-seeking game 
model and a supervision game model are set up. Through analysis, it is found that 
rent-seeking and conspiracy exist in the approval system of OBSA in China. It is 
necessary for supervision departments to enhance inspection and check on illegal 
activities when market bodies gain high profits through illegal acts so as to effectively 













illegal activities and award for supervisors who investigated such illegal activities 
hasn't much relation with their efforts, so it is lack of motivation for supervision 
departments to investigate illegal activities. Therefore, encouragement and monitoring 
over the supervision departments should be enhanced. 
On the above analyzing foundations, the direction for perfecting OBSA market 
supervision is proposed from the view of game theory, that is, to unify the goal of 
supervision over OBSA, establish scientific and reasonable game rules, strengthen 
supervision over the supervisors and enhance supervision over information disclosure 
so as to improve the supervision over OBSA and promote the health and rapid 
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年 10 月份完成股份制改造，2010 年登陆资本市场。华夏银行、兴业银行、民
生银行、浦发银行等股份制商业银行和部分城市商业银行也已实现了上市。按















































业银行之间竞争的结果等等。[2]   
（2）表外业务的盈利性 
约翰·潘扎尔（John C.Panzer）、威利格（Robert D Willig 1981）[3]等提
                                                        

























































 第 4 页
值。关于表外业务信用风险管理，克拉姆巴塔和斯蒂芬赫希（Dara Khambata and 
Stefan W.Hirsch，2002）通过对欧洲 20 家大银行年报数据的分析与美国 20 家
大银行的对比，根据《新巴塞尔协议》要求，强调了表外业务信息披露在风险
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